A generator in the town hall basement does not mean a territorial community (hromada) is ready for a blackout. The real test begins with a different question: for how many hours will water, heating, communications, healthcare and other critical services operate without the external electricity grid?
Ukrainian communities already know power cuts well. During the years of war, generators have been purchased, Points of Invincibility established, and municipal enterprises have gained experience of emergency operations. It may therefore seem that we are more or less prepared for the next difficult winter.
But let us ask the question differently.
At 6 a.m., the community loses its external power supply. It is out for 6 hours. Then 12. One day passes. A second. A third. What continues to operate at each stage, and what will stop?
The answer to this question, rather than the number of generators purchased, reveals the community’s real level of energy resilience.
This is no longer a theoretical scenario. Ukraine’s official preparations for the 2026/27 heating season take account of possible attacks on critical infrastructure. State priorities include backup and alternative power, distributed generation and decentralised heating. (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)
Do not count generators. Count hours
A community may have ten, twenty or fifty generators. That figure alone, however, says almost nothing.
Take a water utility. It has a generator. But can it start the pumping equipment under load? How much fuel does it use per hour? How much fuel is actually stored on site? Who will deliver more if petrol stations are closed or roads are difficult to use? Is there a second generator in case the first breaks down? Who starts it at three in the morning?
If the generator can operate but there is only enough fuel for eight hours, the facility’s autonomy is approximately eight hours, rather than “we have a generator”.
Every facility without which the community cannot function properly should be checked in this way.
What must not stop in the community?
This is probably the first task that can be completed without a single grant.
The community’s critical functions must be identified. This means more than listing municipal buildings; it means answering: what would cause serious problems for people within a few hours if it stopped?
In one community, this will be boreholes and pumping stations. In another, a central boiler house. Elsewhere, a sewage pumping station is critical. Healthcare facilities, communications, emergency services, public support centres and other facilities on which a particular community’s essential services depend must all be considered.
The state is now placing particular emphasis on heating and water supply. As of August, backup power provision for these facilities nationwide stood at around 75.6% of the updated requirement, and regions were tasked with increasing reserves. (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)
For each such facility, the community needs to know one key figure:
6 hours? 12? 24? 72? How long will it actually operate without the external grid?
Water may become a problem before lighting does
When the electricity goes off, the first thing people see is a dark flat. For the community, however, what happens to the water supply may be far more dangerous.
Pumps need electricity. Boreholes need electricity. Wastewater systems also depend on pumps. If the system has high losses, the backup source must spend scarce fuel or stored electricity on water that never even reaches the consumer.
Preparing a water utility for a prolonged outage therefore does not necessarily mean buying another generator. Sometimes a much smarter first step is to replace the least efficient pump, automate its operation or eliminate the largest water losses.
The logic here is very simple: the less energy a system needs to perform a critical function, the easier it is to keep it operating independently.
The same must be done for heating
A particularly dangerous illusion is: “The boiler house runs on gas, so power cuts are no threat to it.”
Pumps, automation, control systems and other auxiliary equipment need electricity. What needs checking is therefore the ability of the entire technical system to operate in emergency mode, rather than simply whether fuel is available.
That is why, during current winter preparations, the government requires both fuel stocks and checks on backup heating systems, alternative heat sources and staff readiness to act in an emergency. (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)
There is a very simple test here: switch off the external power supply and see what actually happens.
Not on paper. Not according to the generator’s specifications. Under real operating conditions.
What happens on the second day?
In my view, communities often fail to ask this question.
The first few hours can be covered by batteries and generators. On the second day, however, entirely different problems arise: fuel runs out, equipment needs servicing, communication devices need charging, staff shifts must change, water deliveries must be organised and vulnerable residents supported.
What needs testing, therefore, is the chain of essential services, rather than an individual generator.
For example: the generator runs for 24 hours → fuel is needed for the next 24 hours → the fuel must be delivered → transport also needs fuel → the driver and responsible staff member must be available → communication with them must work.
Break just one link, and the entire system that looked well prepared on paper may stop.
That is why the state requires regions to have equipment as well as command-and-staff exercises, emergency stocks, trained personnel and clear procedures for cooperation. (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)
72 hours: test your community
I would suggest that every small community carry out one very simple exercise before winter.
Imagine that there is no external power supply for 72 hours.
Take five to ten critical facilities and record the following for each: what must keep working; the minimum electrical power required; what backup source is already available; how many hours it will actually operate; how much fuel or energy is stored on site; who is responsible for starting and maintaining it; what to do if it breaks down; and which single measure would most improve the facility’s autonomy.
An interesting picture may emerge. One facility is ready to operate for three days. Another for 18 hours. A third has a good generator, but insufficient fuel. A fourth has a generator, but it has not been run under a real load for a long time. And a fifth has no backup solution at all.
That is the real map of the community’s energy resilience.
Not the number of generators. Not the number of solar panels.
The number of hours for which the community can maintain critical services for people.
Only then should investment be discussed
Once this map exists, the list of future projects looks very different.
Perhaps the first priority is additional backup for a pumping station rather than a large solar project. Elsewhere, a battery may be the best investment. In another place, it may be a new energy-efficient pump. For another facility, a combination of solar generation, storage and a backup generator makes sense. A large heating system may need gradual decentralisation.
The community then no longer tells a potential partner: “Give us a generator.”
It can say something much more convincing:
“This facility supplies water to 8,000 residents. Today, it can operate independently for 12 hours. We need to increase this to 72 hours. We have tested the system and know what solution is needed.”
