If the power is out for several days: is your community ready?

A generator in the city council basement does not mean the community is ready for a blackout. The real test starts with a different question: for how many hours will water, heating, communications, healthcare and other critical services keep running without the external power grid?

Ukrainian communities already know power outages all too well. Over the years of war, generators have been purchased, Invincibility Points set up, and utilities have built up experience of emergency operation. So it may seem that we are more or less prepared for the next difficult winter.

But let us try to put the question differently.

At 6 a.m., the community loses its external power supply. It is gone for 6 hours. Then 12. A day passes. A second. A third. At each of these stages, what keeps working, and what stops?

It is the answer to this question, not the number of generators purchased, that shows a community’s real level of energy resilience.

And this is no longer a theoretical scenario. Ukraine’s preparations for the 2026/27 heating season officially take into account possible attacks on critical infrastructure. The state’s priorities include backup and alternative power supply, distributed generation and the decentralisation of heat supply. (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)

Don’t count generators. Count hours

A community may have ten, twenty or fifty generators. But on its own, this figure says almost nothing.

Take the water utility. It has a generator. But can it start the pumping equipment under load? How much fuel does it burn per hour? How much fuel is actually stored on site? Who will deliver more if petrol stations are closed or the roads are difficult? Is there a second generator in case the first one breaks down? Who starts it at three in the morning?

If the generator can run but the fuel reserve will only last eight hours, the facility’s autonomy is about eight hours, not “we have a generator”.

Every facility without which the community cannot function normally should be checked in exactly this way.

What in a community must never stop?

This is probably the first task that can be done without any grant at all.

The community’s critical functions need to be identified. Not just by listing municipal buildings, but by answering the question: what would cause people serious problems within a few hours if it stopped?

In one community, these will be boreholes and pumping stations. In another, a centralised boiler house. Somewhere else, the sewage pumping station is critical. Healthcare facilities, communications, emergency services, support points for residents and other facilities on which the life of a particular community depends must also be taken into account.

The state is now placing particular emphasis on heat and water supply. As of August, backup power coverage for these facilities nationwide stood at around 75.6% of the updated requirement, and the regions have been tasked with building up reserves. (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)

For each such facility, the community needs to know one key figure:

6 hours? 12? 24? 72? How long will it actually run without the external grid?

Water can become a problem before the lights do

When the power goes out, people first notice a dark flat. But for the community, what happens to the water can be far more dangerous.

Pumps need electricity. Boreholes need electricity. Sewerage also depends on pumps. If the system has large losses, the backup source also has to spend scarce fuel or stored electricity on water that simply never reaches the consumer.

That is why preparing a water utility for a long outage does not necessarily mean buying another generator. Sometimes a much smarter first step is to replace the least efficient pump, automate its operation or eliminate the biggest water losses.

A very simple logic applies here: the less energy a system needs to perform a critical function, the easier it is to keep it running autonomously.

The same needs to be done for heating

A particularly dangerous illusion: “The boiler house runs on gas, so a power outage is no threat to it.”

Pumps, automation, control systems and other auxiliary equipment need electricity. So what needs checking is not the availability of fuel, but the ability of the entire process system to operate in emergency mode.

That is why, in preparing for this winter, the government requires not only stockpiling fuel but also checking backup heating systems, alternative heat sources and staff readiness to act in an emergency. (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)

And there is a very simple test here: switch off the external power and see what actually happens.

Not on paper. Not according to the generator’s data sheet. Under real operating conditions.

And what happens on day two?

In my opinion, this is the question communities often miss.

The first few hours can be covered by batteries and generators. But on day two, entirely different problems arise: fuel runs out, equipment needs servicing, communication devices need charging, staff need to be rotated, water deliveries have to be organised and vulnerable residents need support.

So what needs to be tested is not a single generator, but the life-support chain.

For example: the generator runs for 24 hours → the next 24 hours require fuel → the fuel has to be delivered → the transport also needs fuel → the driver and the person in charge must be available → communication with them has to work.

Break just one link, and the whole system, so well prepared on paper, may come to a halt.

That is why the state requires the regions to have not only equipment but also command-and-staff exercises, emergency stocks, trained personnel and clear coordination procedures. (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine)

72 hours: put your community to the test

I would suggest that every small community do one very simple exercise before winter.

Imagine that the external power supply is out for 72 hours.

Take five to ten critical facilities and, for each one, write down: what must keep working; what minimum electrical capacity this requires; what backup source is already in place; how many hours it will actually run; how much fuel or energy is stored on site; who is responsible for starting and maintaining it; what we do in the event of a breakdown; and which single measure would most increase the facility’s autonomy.

After that, an interesting picture may emerge. One facility is ready to run for three days. Another, for 18 hours. A third has a good generator but not enough fuel. The fourth has a generator that has not been started under real load for a long time. And the fifth has no backup solution at all.

This is the real map of the community’s energy resilience.

Not the number of generators. Not the number of solar panels.

The number of hours for which the community can keep critical services running for people.

Only then is it time to talk about investment

Once such a map exists, the list of future projects looks completely different too.

Perhaps the first priority is not a large solar project but additional backup for a pumping station. In one place, the best investment will be a battery. In another, a new energy-efficient pump. For another facility, a combination of solar generation, storage and a backup generator makes sense. And a large heating system may need gradual decentralisation.

Then the community no longer says to a potential partner: “Give us a generator.”

It can say something far more convincing:

“This facility supplies water to 8,000 residents. Today its autonomy is 12 hours. We need to bring it up to 72 hours. We have tested the system and know what solution is needed to achieve this.”